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The article historicizes the German ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 in the 
context of post-World War II politics of migration and asylum in the 
country, focusing particularly on the reactions to the ‘crisis’ of 1992. 
That time, government reacted to more than 400,000 refugees from the 
Balkan wars with severe restrictions of the right to asylum, framed also 
within the ‘Dublin Regulation’ of the European Union. It is argued that 
German politics of immigration was mostly a kind of Realpolitik that 
subordinated humanitarian considerations to closed-border politics 
geared at keeping migrants out. Summer 2015, however, saw elements 
of humanitarianism in German refugee politics, understood, following 
Didier Fassin, as the introduction of moral sentiments into politics. This 
‘humanitarianism’ was mostly accredited to Chancellor Angela Merkel. 
Yet the commitment of thousands of members of the German public 
ensured the sustainability of a ‘welcome culture’ intended to 
accommodate refugees, government politics quickly reverted to new 
restrictions that keep immigrants for many months or even years in a 
limbo of waiting. While to some extent government’s humanitarian 
discourse continues it becomes apparent that humanitarian politics is 
often a cover up for ulterior political motives. It is concluded that 
marking the events of 2015 as a refugee crisis enables in the first place 
the legitimization of politics of restriction like the externalization of EU 
borders into North African countries. 
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Introduction: What’s in a Crisis? 
In conventional understanding, a crisis is a turning point, a difficult 
phase and a decisive moment between periods of ‘normalcy’. At 
present, however, ‘crises’ abound; for instance, we have the financial 
crisis, or more specifically in Europe, the Euro crisis, and we have 
economic crises around the globe. The current temporality of crises is 
not just a moment but rather a protracted and dynamic state of affairs, 
the end of which is not in sight. In contrast to the conventional 
understanding of the term, crises have become normal. Thus, the 
‘refugee crisis’ in Europe, which, according to popular discourse, 
began in 2015, goes on. Migrants still attempt to enter Europe, and 
European states take ever-increasing measures to fend them off. 
Discussing a ‘refugee crisis’ rather obscures the fact that these events 
are lined up in a longer historical chain of developments that include 
other ‘crises’ and which are in fact rather a state of normality for 
migration politics and policies in Germany. In spite of their normalcy, 
however, placing the ‘crisis’ label on such events invokes a semantic of 
danger, of emergency, a state of affairs that requires unprecedented 
steps to be taken. The marking of events as crisis enables to do things 
that would otherwise be largely impossible. Strasser (2016) speaks 
about ‘crisis effects’ and requires us to consider the consequences of 
marking a particular time as a crisis. We need to consider, then, which 
political measures are enabled and legitimised by flagging recent events 
as a ‘refugee crises’?  
Politics of Migration in Germany 
Since the 1970s, the debate about immigration (migrants as refugees 
included) has been a field pivotal to the self-understanding of German 
society. Until very recently, the dominant political discourse on 
migration in Germany insisted that the country was not an immigration 
destination, a perspective linked closely to German ideas of citizenship 
based on ‘iussanguinis’ (the right of blood), that is, dependent upon 
descent and not on ‘iussolis’ (the right of the soil), i.e. not depending 
on birth on a territory and participation in the body politic. The 
dominant perspective was and continues to be that immigration is a 
problem for German society, not withstanding a few reforms to 
citizenship legislation. This in contradiction of the fact that after WWII, 
migrants travelled and were even invited to Germany as solution to a 
problem, namely the lack of a workforce in the nation’s fast-growing 
post-war economy. These migrants were called ‘guest workers’, a 
designation that strictly implied temporary work and residence in 
Germany only and precluded their ‘integration’ today’s buzzword into 
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society. This was a fiction, of course, but a very persistent one that for 
decades the dominant political stakeholders refused to give up. In 
addition, the insistence that Germany was not a country of immigration 
was the expression of a normative idea, namely that it must not be a 
country that was open in this regard, which was never an apt 
description of the empirical situation. It has to be noted, however, that 
in the context of the Cold War Germany always welcomed refugees 
from the socialist countries. These were not conceptualised as 
immigrants. ‘Refugee’ was a positively connoted category at that time 
and these refugees were considered as fully deserving admission and 
protection in the country. 
Post-war immigration started in the late 1950s as labour 
migration, but during the 1970s, most immigrants arrived in Germany 
via family unification, and later, after 1980, as refugees, i.e. as migrants 
applying for political asylum. Certainly, not all asylum seekers were 
entitled to political asylum according to the strict letter of the law, 
which requires proof of personal political persecution, but almost no 
other avenue was open for migration to the country. Originally, 
German law on asylum was intended to cater for refugees from the 
‘communist bloc’. Yet, from the 1980s onward, and especially after the 
end of the Cold War, people set in motion by all kinds of conflicts 
across the globe arrived as asylum seekers. The spectre of the 
‘economic refugee’ became a notorious figure of German (anti) 
immigration discourse and legislation, invented to accommodate all 
migrants that could not prove individual political persecution and who 
therefore did not qualify for political asylum according to German law.   
The ‘Refugee Crisis’ of 1990s and its Effects 
The early 1990s saw a major rise in the numbers of refugees arriving in 
Germany, mainly as a result of the Balkan wars and the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia. The figure reached more than 430,000 incoming 
refugees in 1992, a doubling of numbers within one year. This 
development was met with conflicting responses from the German 
population: on the one hand, an increase in deadly racist violence 
against all sorts of migrants in Germany, not only recent asylum 
seekers and on the other hand, strong expressions of solidarity with the 
refugees. The German government reacted by thoroughly restricting the 
law on asylum, because the governing parties feared the rise of 
xenophobic factions on the extreme right. Thereafter, numbers of 
refugees receded substantially, mainly as a consequence of the Dublin 
regulation coming into force in the European Union in 1997. The 
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regulation is an EU law decreeing that those EU member states whose 
territories refugees enter into are responsible for the examination of 
their asylum applications. While outwardly the Dublin regulation was 
intended to preclude multiple applications of asylum in the European 
Union, it actually served as a bulwark for the economically strong EU 
member states, including Germany, to get rid of the ‘refugee problem’. 
The responsibility for the asylum procedure was ‘deported’ to EU 
frontier states bordering the Mediterranean, i.e. Spain, Italy and Greece, 
because these countries were the refugees’ major entry points to 
Europe. Refugees that moved on to other EU states while their asylum 
application was still in process in these countries were pushed back. 
Until 2012, this enabled Germany a quite comfortable situation with 
low numbers of refugees, i.e. fewer than 100,000 applications per year. 
The situation changed in 2013, however, especially due to refugees and 
migrants travelling from the West Balkan states, mostly Albania and 
Kosovo. Numbers crossed the line of 200,000 applications in 2014, 
reaching almost 500,000 in 2015 and around 750,000 in 2016 (figures 
include both new and successive applications)1, the bulk of whom came 
from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.   
Humanitarianism 
The concept of humanitarianism figures prominently in the title of this 
article, but according to my brief résumé, German migration politics do 
not have much linkage with humanitarianism. Didier Fassin presents 
humanitarianism as the introduction of moral sentiments into 
contemporary politics. In his book Humanitarian Reason, Fassin (2012) 
writes:  
Moral sentiments have become an essential force 
in contemporary politics: they nourish its 
discourses and legitimize its practices, particularly 
where these discourses and practices are focused 
on the disadvantaged and the dominated, whether 
at home (the poor, immigrants, the homeless) or 
farther away (the victims of famine, epidemics, or 
war). By ‘moral sentiments’ are meant the 
emotions that direct our attention to the suffering 
of others and make us want to remedy them. 
                                                          
1While many more refugees entered Germany in 2015 than in 2016, for administrative 
reasons many of them could only submit their application for asylum in 2016. 
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We cannot find much of this in German politics of migration, 
although there was of course much humanitarian commitment by non-
state actors in the country; actors that often voiced their concerns about 
the non or even anti-humanitarian politics of the state. As mentioned, 
German politics of migration was dominated by the idea that Germany 
was not an immigration country and that migrants largely needed to be 
kept out. More precisely, and here moral sentiments come to the fore, 
asylum politics was dominated by the idea that asylum needs to be 
limited strictly to those who are really ‘deserving’, that is, to those who 
meet the narrow criteria for political asylum, and that therefore all 
others need to be fenced off. In a strange twist of reasoning, the strict 
politics of keeping those out who are considered as undeserving, or of 
deporting them, was presented as a precondition for offering the 
humanitarian right of asylum to those who were deemed as deserving.  
Humanitarian reasoning also left its mark on the reasons for 
suspending the deportation of rejected asylum seekers. In principle, 
medical reasons figure strongly in this regard, for instance if a person is 
unable to travel due to illness, or if he or she suffers from an illness that 
cannot be treated adequately in the country of deportation. Here too, 
though, criteria were narrowly defined, and today, very few people 
actually qualify for the suspension of deportation due to medical 
reasons.  
Thus, as a whole, German politics of immigration was mostly a 
kind of ‘Realpolitik’ that subordinated humanitarian considerations to 
closed-border politics geared at keeping migrants out. The German 
concept ‘Realpolitik’ is imperfectly translated into English as ‘political 
realism’, but what it actually involves is giving unequivocal priority to 
‘hard’ political (and economic) interests; as they are conceived from 
particular vantage points, of course. The strict limitation of the refugee 
influx, in order not to overburden the German welfare system, to steal 
the thunder of xenophobic forces and, ultimately, to remain in power 
are such interests. Pointedly, one could say that the opposition of 
Realpolitik versus humanitarianism equals an opposition of interests 
versus (moral) values, but of course, interests are linked with values, 
too, and moral values define and justify their own interests.  
Intrusions of Humanitarianism 
While German politics of migration was clearly dominated by 
‘Realpolitik’, there were also ruptures and intrusions made by 
humanitarian rhetoric. Shipwrecks in the Mediterranean, in which 
hundreds of refugees died during the last decade, often made political 
76 
 NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability (NJIPS) Vol.I, No.1                            3 
 
actors pause and express their concern that this ‘humanitarian tragedy’ 
must not continue. In mid-April 2015, for instance, 1200 people 
drowned in the Mediterranean within a few days.2 Nevertheless, such 
concerns did not have many practical consequences, as after every such 
tragic event, this distress lasted for a few days only. After several 
catastrophic shipwrecks in which many hundreds of people lost their 
lives, the Italian government, in October 2013, started the naval 
operation ‘Mare Nostrum’, intended to save the lives of refugees 
experiencing distress on their way across the Mediterranean in unfit 
vessels. When the Italian government proposed that the EU take over, 
the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, 
proclaimed that the EU lacked the funds to do so and that the Italian 
operation had in fact boosted trafficking across the sea because of the 
increased chances of being saved. According to her, the Italian mission 
was more or less responsible for further shipwrecks.3 Mare Nostrum 
was then replaced by the EU mission ‘Triton’, which focused far more 
on controlling the maritime border than on saving the lives of refugees 
in desperate need of help.  
Nonetheless, let us move the focus back to Germany. German 
politicians of the ruling parties generally showed the same reactions to 
the calamities in the Mediterranean, expressing concerns and 
demanding that such things must not go on, albeit without taking 
serious steps to prevent such disasters beyond repeating the demand 
that trafficking had to be controlled and migrants stopped.  However, 
there was a marked change of discourse or rather, an additional thread 
of discourse in 2015, which was where humanitarian reasoning came 
in. The recent development of German refugee politics is generally 
attributed to Chancellor Angela Merkel. This is, no doubt, too narrow a 
perspective, but there was a tangible change in her statements that led 
to this opinion. In mid-July 2015, Merkel took part in a televised 
discussion with high school students in the German city of Rostock. On 
this occasion, she was addressed by Reem, a 15-year-old Palestinian 
girl from Lebanon, who had been living in Germany for four years 
together with her family as asylum seekers. Recently, her family had 
been threatened with deportation, and Reem expressed her worries 
about her own future. Not knowing whether she would be allowed to 
                                                          
2See the report “Death by rescue,” https://deathbyrescue.org/ (accessed 1 July, 2017) 
3“Meer der Hoffnung, Meer des Todes” (Sea of Hope, Sea of Death). Spiegel Online, 
15 September 2014. Available online at 
http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/fluechtlinge-sterben-im-meer-vor-malta-und-libyen-
a-991772.html (accessed 9 September 2017). 
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stay in Germany, she felt distressed, as she was unable to plan her 
further education. She said that she does not know what her future will 
be. Merkel responded to Reem with a classical ‘real political’ 
statement, explaining German politics of asylum and emphasising that 
not all refugees would or could be allowed to stay in Germany. She 
said that politics is sometimes hard, highlighting that ‘we cannot do 
that’, i.e. welcome all potential refugees to the country. Here she used 
almost the same notorious words as in her press conference six weeks 
later, only in a negative way. Responding to Reem, she said, 
‘Dannschaffenwir das nicht’ (Then we will not be able to do this), in 
contrast to her later, notorious phrase ‘Wirschaffen das!’ (We will be 
able to do this!), i.e., accommodate the incoming refugees. 
After this brief exchange, Reem burst into tears. Merkel was 
visibly touched and moved. She paused a few moments, which is rather 
unusual behaviour for a politician live on TV, and then she went over 
to Reem to cuddle her, trying to console the girl.4 This scene can be 
interpreted as the intrusion of a humanitarian gesture into real politics. 
Merkel did not give up her real political perspective, but she tried to 
provide some ‘humanitarian comfort’ rather than a helpless gesture of 
embracing Reem. The moral sentiment urging for the accommodation 
of all refugees in search and need of a better life was met by the real 
political objection that this was a political and practical impossibility. 
Subsequently, Merkel was highly criticised in the (social) media for 
how she acted towards Reem. Merkel’s encounter with Reem can be 
interpreted as a ‘critical event’ in Veena Das’ sense, that is, as an event 
that enables new ways of action (Das, 1995). 
Welcoming Refugees to Germany 
There were more catastrophic capsizing tragedies in the Mediterranean, 
but then, in the second half of August, the ‘humanitarian crisis’ came 
much closer to the borders of Germany. Large numbers of refugees that 
had taken the so-called ‘Balkan route’ towards central Europe, after 
crossing the Aegean from Turkey to the Greek islands, were collecting 
at Budapest’s Keleti station. While all other countries along the route 
had kept their borders open, to enable the smooth transit of the 
refugees, the Hungarian government closed its border to Austria and, 
insisting on the Dublin regulation, did not allow the refugees’ passage.  
On August 21, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
(BAMF) issued a tweet that in Germany the Dublin regulation would 
                                                          
4The scene can be viewed on YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iWPZuZU5t44 
78 
 NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability (NJIPS) Vol.I, No.1                            3 
 
not be applied to refugees from Syria, because of the war and the 
aggravated humanitarian crisis in that country. While this was not an 
official, formally published statement, the tweet rapidly circulated 
among Syrians and other refugees in Hungary and was taken as an 
invitation to travel to Germany. On August 27, an international 
governmental conference on the refugee issue took place in Vienna, 
Austria. On the same day, an abandoned van was found on an Austrian 
motorway close to the Hungarian border in which 71 refugees had died 
from suffocation. The participants at the conference, Chancellor Merkel 
included, expressed their utter horror at this incident (Holmes & Heide, 
2016). 
A few days later, on August 31, Merkel gave a press conference 
in Berlin. In her statement she gave top priority to the topic of peoples 
‘from all over the world’ seeking refuge in Germany.5 She emphasised 
the many tragedies and atrocities that had set the people in motion in 
the first instance and referred also to the people who had suffocated in 
the van. Merkel stated that many organisational issues had to be tackled 
in order to deal with this situation, but that first of all, two principle 
elements needed to be emphasised that should guide all actions in 
relation to the refugees. The first principle was the right to asylum, 
while the second was the dignity of every human being as enshrined in 
the first article of the German constitution. This was a clear 
humanitarian statement, which referred to moral values that should 
guide political and administrative action. Merkel felt compelled to 
underline these values, not only because of the sheer number of 
refugees coming toward Germany, but also, probably more importantly, 
because for months Germany had been haunted by hate crimes and 
right-wing attacks on refugee accommodation centres, arson included. 
While such crimes were committed by a minority of the population 
only, they aroused great concern, as they evoked the deadly racist 
violence of the 1990s and, of course, of Nazism. There was widespread 
fear that anti-immigrant and anti-refugee attitudes were on the rise and 
that new movements and organisations of the extreme right, like 
PEGIDA or the AfD6, could capitalise on such affects and attitudes and 
                                                          
5The full text of Merkel’s statement is available online at the Federal Chancellor’s 
website: 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2
015-08-31-pk-merkel.html (accessed 8 September 2017). 
6PEGiDA is the acronym for “Patriotische-Europäergegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes” (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident), a right-
wing movement against immigration that came into being in October 2014. The AfD 
(“Alternative für Deutschland”, Alternative for Germany) is an originally EU-skeptic 
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ultimately threaten the parties currently in government. Thus, Merkel’s 
invocation of these (moral) principles was meant to preserve the moral 
integrity of German society and encourage a positive attitude toward 
the refugees. In this press conference, Merkel uttered the notorious 
phrase ‘Wirschaffen das!’ i.e., that ‘we’ (the German people) will be 
able to handle the difficult situation in a positive way. When these 
words spread via social media, refugees waiting at Budapest’s station 
joyously celebrated Merkel, which gave them strong encouragement to 
no longer comply with the orders of the Hungarian police to stay where 
they were but to take their destiny into their own hands–or rather, on 
their own feet. As a result, they started marching on a motorway toward 
the Hungarian-Austrian border. Under this pressure, on 1st September 
2015, Victor Orban, the Hungarian prime minister, allowed the 
refugees to cross the Austrian border, while at the same time measures 
were taken to seal the Hungarian-Serbian border, in order to prevent the 
influx of further refugees.  
On 2nd September, a photo of Alan Kurdi, a two-year-old 
Kurdish boy from the Syrian town of Kobane, who had drowned on the 
passage from Turkey to Greece and was subsequently washed up on the 
beach near the Turkish tourism centre of Bodrum, circulated in the 
press. While hundreds of migrants had drowned previously, Alan Kurdi 
now became the symbol of the inhumanity of the current attitudes to 
migration. Again, European and German politicians expressed their 
horror and vowed that such occurrences must be prevented.  
On 4th September, a huge number of refugees approached the 
Austrian-German border. Many of them expressed their wish to reach 
Germany, while others wanted to continue toward the northern 
countries. Merkel and the then Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann 
decided not to close the border and to allow the influx into Germany. 
The next day, therefore, the more or less uncontrolled influx of 
unregistered refugees in Germany began. Crowds of Germans greeted 
them, for instance at Munich’s central station, but also in many other 
cities, holding placards saying ‘Refugees welcome’ and distributing 
gifts. In Munich alone, 20,000 refugees were welcomed on September 
5th and 6th. The German ‘welcome culture’ was born in a marked 
contrast to what government officials generally expected, namely, that 
anti-refugee sentiments would prevail and that such resentments needed 
to be prevented and contained by restrictive politics of migration. 
                                                                                                                                          
party established in 2013, which, since 2015, has taken a strict rightist-populist 
outlook and mainly advocates anti-immigrant positions. 
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Although the right-wing groups were able to muster support and 
created a great clamour, a positive attitude still prevailed, resulting in 
an unbelievable number of people volunteering to support the newly 
arrived refugees in many different respects. In fact, in many places, the 
number of volunteers greatly exceeded the needs of the refugees.  
Realpolitik enters the Scene Again: Restrictive Politics of 
Asylum 
The subsequent politics of migration and asylum in Germany need a 
much more detailed and differentiated analysis, for which the 
observation on the surface humanitarian politics largely continued, 
vowing to welcome and accommodate the refugees and to enable their 
‘integration’ in Germany, at the practical, politics largely reverted to 
the ‘real politics’ of restricting asylum. While, for instance, Syrians 
initially had been promised generous terms and the speedy granting of 
asylum, the level of protection was subsequently limited in most cases 
to temporary ‘subsidiary protection’ only, which, significantly, 
excluded family reunification. Furthermore, living conditions in 
refugee accommodation centres were made difficult, restricting, for 
instance, in many cases the refugees’ right to prepare their own food 
according to their personal habits (Roitman, 2013). 
The opposition of ‘Realpolitik’ and humanitarian politics helps 
in understanding the politics of asylum in Germany, albeit not in a 
straightforward manner which does not necessarily imply that real 
politics is (morally) ‘bad’ and that humanitarianism is intrinsically 
‘good’. In her analysis of French politics on the (non) accommodation 
of immigrants, Miriam Ticktin points out that humanitarian politics 
based on compassion and the urge to alleviate individual suffering is in 
fact a politics of inequality that solidifies hierarchies and largely 
precludes equal rights (Ticktin, 2011). Humanitarian state politics is 
sometimes more concerned with appearing to alleviate suffering than 
with actually ‘doing well’ to people in distress. Humanitarian politics is 
then in the first place a politics of representation that serves to cover up 
real politics. In Germany, for instance, sometimes the suspicion was 
voiced that, after the circulation of the image of Alan Kurdi on the 
Turkish beach, the open border policy of late summer 2015 was also 
intended, in order to prevent ‘ugly images’ possibly emanating from the 
border between Austria and Germany, namely images of police and 
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border patrols forcefully and violently preventing refugees from 
crossing the totally unfenced border.7 
It is safe to assume that many different and often contradictory 
motivations and intentions govern political decisions, the politics of 
migration and asylum included. In Germany, following the ‘summer of 
migration’ of 2015, there is a marked contradiction between the 
continuously voiced insistence that refugees need to ‘integrate’ quickly 
into German society, and the recent packages of asylum law. These 
packages largely preclude integration, by restricting refugees’ right to 
work and education, by requiring them to live in crowded asylum 
centres often situated on the periphery of towns and cities, i.e. far away 
from infrastructures, and by the limitation of resources for German 
language courses. The contradiction between the discourse of 
integration and the practical politics of keeping refugees for years, 
waiting in a limbo of uncertainty, could not be more marked.  
Unsurprisingly, politics is dominated by strategies and 
considerations of power: the restrictive politics of asylum intends to 
placate possible supporters of right-wing groups, taking over some of 
their demands in a slightly softened manner. It is also meant as a form 
of deterrent to people across the globe that might consider travelling to 
Germany as refugees, thereby delivering them the message that living 
as a refugee in this country is not a walk in the park and that 
deportation is most likely. In the politically intended urge to decide on 
asylum applications as quickly as possible, in order to reduce the 
number of asylum seekers swiftly, decisions on asylum are made as if 
on a conveyor belt, producing many mistakes and often utterly 
inhumane outcomes. In many cases, for instance, people have been 
deported that were indeed already well integrated, and in some cases 
families were separated by deportation. Official discourse on asylum 
and refugees is currently dominated by two aspects. On the one hand, 
there is the emphasis that ‘deserving’ refugees need to be 
accommodated and integrated, while on the other hand, there is 
insistence on the strict deportation of the ‘undeserving’ (Holmes and 
Castaneda 2016). What this discourse ignores, though, is the fact that in 
many cases it is very difficult, if not outright impossible, to neatly tell 
the deserving from the undeserving. In most cases, human destinies do 
not fit neatly into either of these categories.  
                                                          
7In his account of the events journalist Robin Alexander insinuates that the border 
remained open only because nobody in government wanted to take the responsibility 
for such images (Alexander, 2017, p. 23). 
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Conclusion: Crisis Effects 
In my interpretation, Chancellor Merkel’s encounter with Reem can be 
regarded as a ‘critical event’ in the sense of Veena Das, namely as an 
event that enabled new ways of taking action (Das, 1995). Of course, 
this encounter did not stand alone; it was suspended in a series of 
events in which the problematic humanitarian aspects of current 
refugee policies in Europe became most obvious. Nonetheless, this 
particular encounter touched Merkel directly and she was visibly 
moved, while at the same time, she was defending the realist rationale 
of German politics in relation to refugees and asylum. Maintaining this 
realist position became much more difficult, considering the 
‘humanitarian intrusion’. Asylum politics in Germany was 
subsequently dominated by the tension between real politics and 
humanitarianism. While ‘realism’ mostly prevailed over practical 
politics, humanitarianism was increasingly becoming a matter of 
rhetoric only. Both modes of politics, however, flagged the events in 
question as a ‘crisis’.  
In conclusion, the effects of this particular crisis can be 
illustrated. After 2015, through a number of legislative changes, 
politics of asylum in Germany became much more rigid and in some 
aspects even repressive. This effect is amplified by the increasing 
securitisation of related policies after several attacks committed by men 
who entered Germany as refugees. Here, two ‘crises’ converge, namely 
the ‘refugee crisis’ and the ‘terrorism crisis’, enabling in the first place 
a highly increased level of control and surveillance. At the European 
level, the refugee crisis enables a new kind of ‘externalisation policy’ 
that shifts the EU’s borders to Turkey and to Northern Africa and turns 
countries like Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt or even Libya into extra-
territorial European border posts. While this is seemingly also meant to 
reduce the number of calamities in the Mediterranean, the 
externalisation of borders in fact does not save any lives. According to 
Giuseppe Loprete, the IOM Chief of Mission in Niger, probably more 
migrants die while attempting to cross the Sahara than on the passage 
across the Mediterranean, and yet these deaths are hardly recorded. One 
significant effect of externalisation is that humanitarian issues are 
largely pushed out of sight in Europe, while at the same time NGOs 
running sea rescue operations in the Mediterranean are criminalised as 
collaborating in human smuggling. The Italian government even termed 
these rescue operations ‘pull factors’ endangering the lives of migrants. 
This was not the first time that on a humanitarian pretext the 
heightened control of maritime borders had forced migrants to take 
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even more dangerous courses. A decade ago, for example, the EU’s 
border security agency Frontex’s mission Hera forced back migrants 
that intended to reach the Canary Islands and compelled them to take 
the hazardous Sahara route instead migrants that often had to move 
because EU fishery policies destroyed their sources of income in West 
African states. Gregory Feldman quotes an EU official who, in 2008, 
had already justified such moves as efforts toward saving lives 
(Feldman, 2011). 
Humanitarianism is often understood as the urge to alleviate the 
suffering of strangers (Calhoun, 2008), as a ‘politics of compassion’ 
(Fassin, 2012). However, those in plight must first become visible as 
humans that deserve compassion and not suffer beyond the sight of 
those that can alleviate their suffering. Nevertheless, German and 
European refugee policies ensure that in future, such suffering will not 
come too close to Europe again. The ordeal of migrants on their way to 
Europe is hidden behind the smokescreen of the humanitarian rhetoric 
of saving lives in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, humanitarianism is 
about compassion and charity; it is not about justice and rights. The 
humanitarian motive totally ignores the global inequities that, besides 
political repression, put migrants on the move in search of a future for 
themselves and their families. In the last instance, then, the 
humanitarian rhetoric serves to cover-up the effects of an unjust liberal 
global economic order.  
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